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The Center of Excellence SAFE – “Sustainable Architecture 
for Finance in Europe” – is a cooperation of the Center for 
Financial Studies and Goethe University Frankfurt. It is 
funded by the LOEWE initiative of the State of Hessen 
(Landes-Offensive zur Entwicklung wissenschaftlich-öko-
nomischer Exzellenz). SAFE brings together more than 40 
professors and just as many junior researchers who are all 
dedicated to conducting research in support of a sustainable 
financial architecture. The Center has two main pillars: 
excellent research on all important topics related to finance; 
and policy advice, including the dissemination of relevant 
research findings to European decision makers from the 
realms of politics, regulation and administration.
In order to promote a fruitful exchange with interested par-
ties from politics, academia, business and the media, SAFE 
issues a newsletter on a quarterly basis. This aims to provide 
an overview of the Center‘s ongoing research and policy ac-
tivities. The SAFE Newsletter succeeds the House of Finance 
Newsletter, which was published between 2009 and 2012. 
SAFE is based at Goethe University’s House of Finance how-
ever extends beyond by drawing on scholars from other 
parts of Goethe University as well as from fellow research 
institutions. The Center builds on the reputation of the 
House of Finance institutions, serving as an interdiscipli-
nary think tank on the issue of finance.
About SAFE3
We are looking back on some exciting months, which saw 
all  of  the  institutions  at  the  House  of  Finance  kept  very 
busy and always “on go”. The reason, though positive, also 
represents a challenge: as we reported in the Q3/2012 issue, 
the Center for Financial Studies and Goethe University have 
been successful with their joint venture under the Hessian 
excellence initiative LOEWE (Landes-Offensive zur Entwick-
lung  wissenschaftlich-ökonomischer  Exzellenz). They  have 
won EUR 13 million in funding – which covers the ﬁrst three 
years of a six-year period – for the establishment of a new 
research center within the House of Finance: the Center of 
Excellence SAFE which is short for “Sustainable Architecture 
for Finance in Europe”.
SAFE opened its doors in January 2013 and not only embraces 
a good number of House of Finance researchers and staff, 
but also extends its reach far beyond its base by drawing on   
scholars and disciplines from other parts of Goethe Univer-
sity as well as from fellow research institutions. In other 
words:  our  family  is  growing,  which  makes  us  all  happy, 
proud, and, of course, rather busy.
SAFE can build on the reputation that the House of Finance 
has successfully acquired since its opening in May 2008. With 
the LOEWE funding, we are now able to make a great leap for-
ward in terms of our overall goal: to become a leading Europe-
an research center on all areas relevant to the development of 
a sustainable ﬁnancial architecture, which includes a dynamic 
interaction with policy makers and society.
Reﬂecting the new set-up, the House of Finance Newsletter 
will now be transformed into the SAFE Newsletter. Please 
be assured that we will not relax in our efforts to provide 
you with highly informative pages on our current research 
ﬁndings and policy output. Needless to say, we will also keep 
you posted on the latest developments within the House of 
Finance.
Thank you for your continuous interest. We very much 
hope that you will enjoy reading the first issue of the 
SAFE Newsletter!
Yours sincerely,
Wolfgang König
Wolfgang König 
Executive Board 
Center of Excellence SAFE 
Executive Director 
House of Finance
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Content4
One of the important lessons from the 
2007-09 ﬁnancial crisis is that systemic 
risk  and  spillover  effects  are  signiﬁ-
cantly  underestimated  in  most  widely 
used  risk  measures  and  that  standard 
risk measurement instruments, such as 
value-at-risk (VaR), need to be adjusted 
to adequately reﬂect overall risk. In this 
paper,  we  propose  a  state-dependent 
sensitivity (SDS) VaR for quantifying risk 
spillovers among sets of different ﬁnan-
cial institutions. We estimate a system 
of quantile regressions for four sets of 
ﬁnancial institutions (commercial banks, 
investment banks, hedge funds and in-
surance companies), in which each type 
of  ﬁnancial  institution  is  represented 
by an index of several ﬁrms. In addition, 
our empirical model explicitly accounts 
for the effects of different market states 
(tranquil,  normal  and  volatile)  on  the 
magnitude of risk spillovers.
We trace out the time path of how shocks move 
through the system using impulse response func-
tions.  The  SDSVaR  model  explicitly  reveals  the 
magnitude  of  risk  spillovers  at  a  certain  point 
in  time.  Moreover,  in  contrast  to  dynamic  cor-
relations, we are able to obtain the direction of 
spillovers from one set of institutions to another. 
Hence,  the  approach  permits  a  delineation  of 
spillover effects from shocks affecting the ﬁnan-
cial sector as a whole.
Hedge funds and systemic risk
As opaque and highly leveraged investment part-
nerships, hedge funds have recently received at-
tention as a potential source of contagion, a trans-
mission channel of risk between diffe-rent asset 
classes  and  as  a  potential  ampliﬁer  of  systemic 
risk in ﬁnancial markets. If highly leveraged hedge 
funds are forced to liquidate large position at ﬁre-
sale  prices,  counterparties  sustain  heavy  losses. 
This may lead to further defaults or threaten sys-
temically important institutions, not only directly 
as  counterparties  or  creditors  but  also  indirectly 
through asset price adjustments (Bernanke, 2006).
While most observers tend to agree that hedge 
funds have some systemic importance, little evi-
dence exists on the magnitude of potential spill-
over effects. In this paper, we provide the ﬁrst 
empirical  estimates  of  the  size  of  intra-month 
spillover effects from hedge funds to other ﬁnan-
cial institutions.
A new approach to measuring spillover effects
Recently,  Adrian  and  Brunnermeier  (2010)  pro-
posed  CoVaR  as  a  measure  for  systemic  risk. 
This conditional VaR measure incorporates the 
additional  risk  in  ﬁnancial  institution  i  caused 
by institution j being in distress. A substantial 
difference between institution j’s CoVaR and its 
VaR measure then indicates a signiﬁcant contri-
bution of this institution to general systemic risk. 
Adrian  and  Brunnermeier  argue  that  a  higher 
contribution  to  systemic  risk  should  result  in 
higher capital surcharges for this institution. In 
this paper, we show that the intensity of the con-
tribution of a given set of institutions to systemic 
risk strongly depends on whether the economy is 
in a vulnerable or resilient state ex ante.
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“Continued focus on counterparty risk management is likely the best course for addressing systemic concerns related to hedge funds.”  Ben S. Bernanke (2006)5
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In  contrast  to  the  CoVaR  model  of  Adrian  and 
Brunnermeier  (2010),  which  relies  on  quantile   
regression to model the distribution of returns, 
the SDSVaR proposed in this paper models the 
distribution of the value-at-risk. After calculating 
the VaR for each set of institutions, we regress 
these VaRs over the whole range of quantiles on 
each other, i. e. we regress the VaR of investment 
banks on the VaR of commercial banks, hedge 
funds and insurance companies. The important 
point is that movements in the VaR change with 
the ﬁnancial health of an institution. During tran-
quil market times, i. e. high quantiles of the VaR 
distribution,  when  institutions  have  plenty  of 
cushion to absorb shocks, risk spillovers between 
ﬁnancial  institutions  are  likely  to  be  marginal. 
When the ﬁnancial crisis hit in 2007, the behav-
ior of the VaR changed dramatically. The higher 
risk faced in the market not only turned the VaR 
strongly negative, i. e. low quantiles of VaR distri-
bution, but also caused the VaR to become more 
volatile. During this period, dormant linkages that 
were building up during tranquil periods sudden-
ly became visible and led to high spillovers. 
Results
As an example of the results we obtain, Figure 1 
presents the effects from changes in the aggre-
gate hedge fund VaR on the VaR of investment 
banks. As a reference point, the solid blue line 
represents the spillover coefﬁcient implied by the 
CoVaR model of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010). 
This  line  represents  the  average  spillover  effects 
emerging from the model. Slopes are estimated to 
be much ﬂatter during tranquil market periods (i. e. 
less spillover effects) and much steeper (i. e. more 
spillover effects) during volatile market phases.
Speciﬁcally, during normal market times, a one per-
centage point increase in the VaR of hedge funds 
is  estimated  to  increase  the  VaR  of  investment 
banks by 0.09 percentage points. The same shock, 
however, increases the VaR of the investment bank 
industry by 0.71 percentage points during times of 
ﬁnancial distress. Similarly, during normal times, 
a one percent increase in the value-at-risk of com-
mercial banks leads to a 0.01 percentage point in-
crease in the VaR of investment banks. In times of 
ﬁnancial distress, the spillovers from commercial 
banks to investment banks increases to 0.05 per-
centage points. We obtain similar magnitudes for 
spillovers from investment banks to other ﬁnancial 
institutions,  while  insurance  companies  tend  to 
exhibit few spillover effects, even in crisis times. 
Hence,  while  spillover  effects  increase  overall, 
hedge fund spillovers to other ﬁnancial institutions 
increase by much more and are of a much higher 
economic signiﬁcance. 
The ﬁndings support initiatives such as that of 
Andrew W. Lo (2008), who in his testimony for 
the U.S. House of Representatives emphasized 
that  hedge  funds  should  be  required  to  pro- 
vide  more  information  on  a  conﬁdential  basis 
to regulators in order to enable them to more 
accurately assess the risks in the ﬁnancial sec-
tor. They also suggest that limiting supervision 
and regulation to depository institutions may be 
misguided.
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Figure 1: Value-at-risk scatter plots and quantile effects for selected ﬁnancial institutions
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Both  the  ﬁnancial  crisis  and  the  sove-
reign debt crisis have exposed shortcom-
ings in  the legal framework governing 
the prudential supervision of cross-bor-
der banking groups. This article identi-
ﬁes the current division of competences 
between  a  transnational  bank’s  home 
and  host  supervisory  authorities  and 
the  required  cooperation  among  these 
watchdogs  as  a  critical  aspect.  In  par-
ticular, it ﬁnds tying authorities’ compe-
tences to banks’ organizational choices, 
i. e. the option to conduct foreign opera-
tions through an independently incorpo-
rated subsidiary or a legally dependent 
branch, to be particularly problematic.
Centralization, apart from constituting a realistic 
option  only  under  particular  circumstances  like 
those prevailing at the moment in the European 
Union (EU), cannot solve all the problems. As an 
alternative, this article proposes a framework that 
is neither based on the legal form of a bank’s cross-
border operations nor relies on unrealistic assump-
tions  of  transnational  cooperation.  Instead,  the 
recommended proposal pays close attention to the 
economics  of  public  administration  and  interna-
tional relations in allocating competences among 
national and supranational supervisory bodies.    
Banks’ organizational choices 
Recent  intra-group  restructurings,  both  in  the 
United  States  and  in  Europe,  have  been  criti-
cized  by  the  business  press  as  attempts  at   
regulatory  arbitrage  in  the  face  of  tightened 
prudential regulation in the ﬁnancial sector. In 
fact, the regulatory initiatives taken as reactions 
to both the global ﬁnancial and the European 
sovereign debt crisis afﬁrm that enhanced pru-
dential oversight on a consolidated basis, with 
robust  own-funds  requirements,  liquidity  buf-
fers etc., is regarded as a pivotal element in the 
prevention of future crises. By looking into some 
of the assailed transactions that have involved 
the  conversion  of  independently  incorporated 
subsidiaries  into  legally  dependent  branches, 
the article ﬁnds no convincing corroboration of 
the alleged escape from rigid regulation.      
In order to arrive at a more informed idea of which 
determinants apart from a perceived appetite for 
regulatory  arbitrage  drive  banks’  organizational 
choices, the article scrutinizes the merits and de-
merits of either a branch – or a subsidiary – struc-
ture in the cross-border business of ﬁnancial in-
stitutions. In doing so, it also considers the policy 
makers‘ perspective. The analysis shows that no 
one-size-ﬁts-all organizational structure is avail-
able  and  concludes  that  banks’  choices  should 
generally not be second-guessed, particularly be-
cause they are subject to (some) market discipline. 
Allocation of competences under the Basel Core 
Principles and EU legislation
In light of these ﬁndings, the question becomes 
how  can  competences  regarding  the  pruden-
tial  supervision  of  banks  be  distributed  so  that   
effective  oversight  is  provided  for  without  im-
peding banks’ organizational choices. The analy-
Tobias Tröger 
Goethe University
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Organizational Choices of Banks and the Effective Supervision  
of Transnational Financial Institutions7
sis describes and evaluates how competences in 
prudential  supervision  were  allocated  among 
national and supranational supervisory authori-
ties during the recent crises. It ﬁnds that both the 
“Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
and  the  EU‘s  Directive  2006/48/EC  on  banking 
required extensive information-sharing and coop-
eration between supervisors in different jurisdic-
tions without providing for a powerful arbitrator 
in case of refusal or dissent. Moreover, the compe-
tences of host supervisors vis-à-vis the home/con-
solidating supervisor varied, largely depending on 
whether the bank had opted for a subsidiary – or a 
branch – structure for conducting its cross-border 
business, with the divergence being particularly 
strong in the EU (see Figure 1).
In order to assess the legal analysis, the article 
employs insights gained from the economics of 
public administration and international relations. 
It argues that the supervisory architecture should 
pay closer attention to and be more aligned with 
bureaucrats’ incentives. Hence, inefﬁcient require-
ments  for  cooperation  and  information-sharing 
should be reduced. Contrary to a widespread per-
ception, even where this option is available – like 
currently in the EU – shifting responsibilities to 
a supranational authority cannot solve all of the 
problems identiﬁed and creates problems of its 
own.  Moreover,  with  regard  to  global  systemi-
cally important ﬁnancial institutions (G-SIFIs), it 
remains indispensable to develop a regime that 
facilitates  effective  supervision  by  vesting  local 
authorities with exercisable powers. 
Proposed regime of mutual recognition
Resting  on  these  foundations,  the  article  ﬁnally 
sketches a solution that contemplates far-reach-
ing  mutual  recognition  of  national  supervisory 
regimes  and  allocates  competences  in  line  with 
supervisors’  incentives  and  the  risk  inherent  in 
cross-border banking groups. It argues that com-
petences should be assigned following the current 
EU solution for branch structures, i. e. the pruden-
tial architecture should always provide for a strong 
home  supervisor  (national  or  supranational),  re-
gardless of the legal structure of the transnational 
banking group. As an exception, discrete compe-
tences should be given to host supervisors where 
the banking group’s activities are deemed signiﬁ-
cant from the perspective of the foreign economy.
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Figure 1: Allocation of competences under the EU Directive 2006/48/EC on banking
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Couples  in  retirement  face  the  chal-
lenge  to  derive  consumption  and  in-
vestment  policies  that  will  maximize 
their  joint  lifetime  utility,  subject  to 
pre-existing retirement income and the 
savings accumulated during the course 
of  the  working  life. They  invest  their 
wealth in capital market instruments, 
typically stocks and bonds, or insurance 
products,  such  as  term  life  insurance 
or  life  annuity  contracts.  Today,  it  is 
an open question how retired couples 
should optimally combine these prod-
ucts in their retirement portfolio.
We  present  a  portfolio  choice  model  for  a 
re-tired couple with an intentional bequest  
motive, the desire to leave some wealth to 
the next generation, and uncertainty about 
their  joint  lifetimes.  In  the  classical  single 
agent model (see Cocco et al., 2005), the un-
certain lifetime leads to the risk of the house-
hold outliving its assets. Explicitly modeling 
a couple and a surviving spouse, our model 
adds  another  aspect  to  this  risk:  the  early 
death of one spouse may result in an income 
drop for the surviving partner that substan-
tially exceeds the corresponding reduction in 
consumption needs. We analyze how private 
annuities  and  life  insurance  can  help  miti-
gate this risk. 
Previous papers (see Inkmann and Michaeli-
des, 2012) argue that the empirically observed 
life  insurance  demand  of  households  indi-
cates the existence of a pure bequest motive. 
In contrast to these papers, by modeling both 
spouses, we are able to disentangle this pure 
bequest motive from a provision motive, the 
desire that, after one’s death, the surviving 
spouse is financially secure.
Our main results are that private annuities are 
mainly purchased to achieve a symmetrical dis-
tribution of annuitized income between both 
spouses. High life insurance holdings are pre-
dominantly caused by the provision motive and 
only to a very small extent by a pure bequest 
motive. In an empirical analysis of the Health 
and  Retirement  Study  (HRS),  we  ﬁnd  strong 
support for our model predictions.
Model description
We  model  the  couple  and  surviving  spouses 
as a Markov chain, whereas the transitions to  
widowhood  are  given  by  the  survival  proba-
bilities. Compared to a widow or a widower, a 
couple has higher consumption needs. Empiri-
cal studies (see Lazear and Michael, 1980) have 
found that with economies of scale, this is con-
siderably less than twice as high. As a conse-
quence, a surviving widow needs to consume 
only slightly less than before with her partner.
They may buy single annuities as well as joint 
annuities, which pay till the last spouse dies. 
This combination allows to endogenously de-
termine  the  optimal  survivor  beneﬁt  factor 
Andreas Hubener 
Goethe University
Raimond Maurer  
Goethe University
Ralph Rogalla  
Goethe University 
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of annuity income. Each partner can purchase 
one-year term life insurance. Besides these pur-
chases, the couple also decides on how much 
to consume and how to invest the remaining 
liquid wealth in risky stocks and riskless bonds. 
Model predictions
To present the results of our theoretical model, 
we distinguish two cases. First, the couple’s an-
nual income of $30,000 is symmetrically dis-
tributed. Whichever partner dies ﬁrst, any sur-
viving spouse receives two-thirds of the initial 
income. This resembles the US social security 
retirement system with its spousal and widow 
beneﬁts.  Second,  the  same  annual  income  is 
asymmetrically distributed, resulting in only a 
small income reduction for a widower (-17%), 
but leaving a widow with only one-third of ini-
tial income. This can be seen as a combination 
of social security and a private pension for the 
husband without any widow beneﬁts. In both 
cases, the couple also has liquid assets worth 
$240,000.
In the symmetric case, the couple has a very low 
annuity demand and buys only small amounts 
of joint annuities. In the asymmetric case, how-
ever,  the  couple  buys  large  amounts  of  single 
annuities for the wife to reduce income asym-
metry.  But  even  the  substantial  liquid  assets 
are insufﬁcient to remove the asymmetry com-
pletely.  Consequently,  the  husband  holds  sig-
niﬁcant amounts of life insurance (see Figure 1). 
The initial life insurance face values (payout to 
the widow upon husband’s death) in the asym-
metric case are multiple times higher than in the 
symmetric case ($171,000 compared to $27,000). 
These face values decrease with age as the ex-
pected  remaining  lifetime  of  the  widow  be-
comes smaller. For the wife, we ﬁnd negligible 
life insurance demands. A pure bequest motive, 
on  the  other  hand,  only  affects  life  insurance 
demand for households with very few liquid as-
sets. This is proof that the life insurance demand 
is mainly caused by the provision motive, which 
is considerably higher in the case with asymmet-
ric income and decreases with expected lifetime.
Empirical support
An analysis of the life insurance holdings of el-
derly US households in the HRS backs our model‘s 
ﬁndings.  As  a  measure  of  income  asymmetry, 
we use the husband’s share of the household’s 
private pension income, which usually has lower 
widow beneﬁts than social security. A probit re-
gression shows that an increase in this pension in-
come share results in a signiﬁcant increase in the 
probability of the husband holding life insurance. 
In an OLS regression, we ﬁnd that the pension in-
come share also has a signiﬁcant positive effect 
on the life insurance face values. Even though our 
empirical analysis cannot strictly rule out a pure 
bequest motive, the number of children has only 
insigniﬁcant effects on life insurance holdings.
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Figure 1: Face values of a husband’s life insurance 
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Credit  rating  agencies  are  moving  to   
the center of the debate in the current 
sovereign  debt  crisis  and  the  repercus-
sions of wrong downgrades are becoming 
greater.  Consequently,  the  civil  liability 
of credit rating agencies is subject to an 
unprecedentedly  intense  regulatory  de-
bate in the rating industry. Only recently   
the  European  Commission  has  put  for-
ward a proposal for a regulation (CRA3) to 
amend and strengthen the 2009 version 
of the EU Rating Regulation, among other 
things imposing civil liability on the agen-
cies. Art. 35a of the Commission’s Draft 
Proposal  introducing  a  mandatory  civil   
liability of credit rating agencies has been 
one of the most controversial changes of 
this proposal, which has partially found 
its way into the legislative resolution of 
the European Parliament of January 16, 
2013.
To  evaluate  the  European  Commission’s  CRA3 
proposal, it is worthwhile to look at existing rules 
on civil liability of rating agencies. In the Europe-
an member states there is no speciﬁc legislation 
governing contracts between issuers and credit 
rating agencies, so that the general rules of con-
tract law apply. 
Under German law the debate on contractual li-
ability of rating agencies centers on the potential 
existence of an implicit agreement between the 
issuer and the rating agency in favor of investors 
as third parties. Basing investor claims on an im-
plicit  agreement  seems  problematic,  however, 
as the interests of investors and issuers are not 
aligned. Whereas the issuer is interested in the 
highest possible rating, the investor may prefer 
a lower rating in the interest of a cheaper entry-
level price. Another concern is that in the case of 
issuer insolvency there is a danger that the insol-
vency risk is shifted to the rating agency if now 
the rating agency can be held liable by investors.
Finally, a quasi-contractual liability between rating 
agencies  and  investors  could  arguably  be  estab-
lished, arising as a precontractual liability because 
of the trust placed in rating agencies in reliance on 
their expertise, thus favorably inﬂuencing contract 
negotiations or the conclusion of a contract. In the 
typical rating scenario, these requirements for qua-
si-contractual liabi-lity are not met for lack of im-
mediate contact between the party held liable and 
the claimant. However, the liability for misstate-
ments in a prospectus based on general German 
civil law may offer room to argue by analogy to ar-
rive at some kind of gatekeeper/expert liability of   
rating agencies.
Liability in the EU Commission’s draft proposal
In light of the serious ﬂaws in the Big Three’s rat-
ings and their contribution to the ﬁnancial crisis 
as  well  as  their  involvement  in  the  sove-reign 
debt crisis, the CRA3 Draft Proposal presented by 
the European Commission included a very strict 
liability rule in Art. 35a. Its strictness resulted from 
the procedural facilitation in Art. 35a paras. 2-4 of 
the Draft Proposal, leading to a shift in the bur-
den of proof, so that it would be sufﬁcient for the 
investor to establish “…facts from which it may 
be inferred that a credit rating agency has com-
mitted  any  of  the  infringements…”.  Therefore 
the burden would have been on the credit rating 
Brigitte Haar
Goethe University
The Path Towards Civil Liability of Credit Rating Agencies  
in Europe under CRA3
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agency to prove that it had not committed that 
infringement or that that infringement did not 
have an impact on the issued credit rating. At the 
bottom line, under this provision, rating agencies 
would have had to provide proof of the ﬂawless-
ness of their ratings, eventually putting them un-
der pressure to disclose their methods and mode-
ling inputs. 
This was very much at odds with the limits of dis-
closure duties as stated in the EU Rating Regulation 
of 2009, which should not jeopardize trade secrets 
nor  impede  innovation.  Such  a  disclosure  might 
eliminate competition for the best rating methods, 
thus thwarting the desired goal of the European 
Commission  to  strengthen  competition.  What  is 
even more detrimental to competition, is its poten-
tially deterring effect on market entry of new com-
petitors, who will shy away from these high liabi-
lity risks. In addition, far-reaching liability will have 
a chilling effect on capital markets because rating 
agencies may be reluctant to rate some ﬁnancial 
instruments at all, as has become apparent from 
the example of the consequences of the newly in-
troduced expert liability of rating agencies in the 
Dodd-Frank Act in the USA.
Amendments by EU Council and Parliament
Against  this  background  of  incisive  criticism 
against the stringent liability rule, the European 
Council has voted for a removal of the reversal 
of the burden of proof and the European Par-
liament and the Legal Affairs Committee have 
favored the inclusion of common civil liability 
rules for deliberate and negligent infringements 
of the rules of the EU rating regulation. 
Despite the wide range of proposals to amend 
the  Draft  Proposal  of  the  EU  Commission, 
negotiations  in  the  European  Parliament   
and the Council reached an agreement on the 
accountability of rating agencies on November 
27, 2012. The polished legislative text ﬁnally ad-
opted on January 16, 2013 requires investors, in 
order to establish liability of rating agencies, to 
demonstrate  “that  he  has  reasonably  relied…” 
and  “…to  present  accurate  and  detailed  infor-
mation indicating that the credit rating agency 
has  committed  an  infringement…,  and  that 
that infringement had an impact on the credit 
rating  issued.”  Interestingly,  the  determina-
tion of compliance with this standard is left to 
the respective member state’s legal system, so 
that  potential  shortcomings  of  the  traditional 
national liability provisions remain unresolved. 
What is more, the additional issue of an open 
market for capital in the European Union under 
uniform standards may be raised.
The full article “Civil Liability of Credit Rating 
Agencies  –  Regulatory  All-or-Nothing  Approa-
ches Between Immunity and Over-Deterrence” 
is available for download at: 
http://safe-frankfurt.de/policy-publications/ 
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Minister hands over 
LOEWE Certiﬁcates
On 6 February 2013, a ceremony was held in Goethe 
University’s casino building to celebrate the start 
of the University’s new “LOEWE” (Landes-Offensive 
zur  Entwicklung  wissenschaftlich-ökonomischer 
Exzellenz)  entities.  Eva  Kühne-Hörmann,  Hessian 
Minister  of  Higher  Education,  Research  and  the 
Arts, handed over a letter of approval to Jan Pieter 
Krahnen (standing on the right), the representa- 
tive of the Center of Excellence SAFE. SAFE has been 
granted a ﬁrst tranche of EUR 13 million under the 
State  of  Hessen‘s  LOEWE  excellence  initiative  as 
ﬁrst part of a projected six-year funding period. 
Symposium on “Central 
Banking: Where are we  
headed?” 
On 7 February 2013,  the Institute 
for Monetary and Financial Stability 
(IMFS) and the House of Finance 
honored  Stefan  Gerlach,  Deputy 
Governor  of  the  Central  Bank  of 
Ireland,  for  his  contributions  to 
the IMFS in his former capacityas 
Managing  Director.  The  celebration  was  held  in 
the form of a symposium, titled “Central Banking: 
Where are we headed?”
A key issue was the proposed single supervisory 
mechanism for the Eurozone to be established at the 
European Central Bank (ECB). According to Sabine 
Lautenschläger, Deputy President of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank,  and  Benoît  Cœuré,  Member  of  the   
Executive Board of the ECB, a strict separation be-
tween  monetary  policy  and  banking  supervision 
is essential when assigning the supervision of the 
Eurozone area banks to the ECB. Patrick Honohan, 
Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, asked the 
fundamental question whether the ECB should be 
responsible  for  banking  supervision  in  the  long 
run. Despite these reservations, the central bankers 
described a common banking supervision as an im-
portant step to adapt the institutional framework 
of the Eurozone in response to the crisis.
In  the  second  part  of  the  symposium,  Athanasios   
Orphanides from the MIT Sloan School of Manage-
ment (and a former Governor of the Central Bank of 
Cyprus) compared the ways in which European gov-
ernments acted in former crises with their response 
to the current crisis. He described how the European 
Union‘s political leadership is in a state of crisis.   
Michael Burda from the School of Business and Eco-
nomics at Humboldt Universität in Berlin gave his out -
look on what the Eurozone will look like in ten years.
Discussion on the Future of Universal Banking
On 25 January 2013, Jan Pieter Krahnen, Co-Director of SAFE and the Cen-
ter  for  Financial  Studies,  and  Michael  Kemmer,  General  Manager  of  the  
Association  of  German  Banks  (Bundesverband  deutscher  Banken),  talked 
about the future of the universal banking model. This was the second event 
in  the  SAFE  Policy  Center‘s  discussion  series  on  structural  reforms  in  the  
European banking sector. The series aims to debate the report of the Liikanen 
Group  of  which  Jan  Pieter  Krahnen  was  a  member.  The  Group‘s  report  
suggests spinning off all of the trading activities of major banks in order  
to have a distinct separation between retail business and trading business in 
their ﬁnancial structures. “In our view, both businesses should be ﬁnancially 
independent and take their respective risks by themselves”, said Krahnen.  
Michael  Kemmer  defended  the  current  universal  banking  model.  He  ex-
pressed  the  fear  that  disbanding  traditional  structures  could  throw  the  
whole  European  banking  system  off  balance.  Only  a  few  days  after  the 
discussion,  the  German  government  came  up  with  a  legislative  initiative  
that  calls  for  spinning  off  only  banks‘  proprietary  trading.  According  to  
Krahnen, this “Liikanen light” would require a lot of energy, but be of little 
advantage.
News • Center of Excellence SAFE • Quarter 1/2013
Deutsche Bank Prize 
awarded to Raghuram  
G. Rajan
The Center for Financial Studies (CFS) 
has awarded the 5th Deutsche Bank 
Prize in Financial Economics 2013 
to Raghuram G. Rajan for his highly 
inﬂuential contributions in a broad 
range  of  areas  in  ﬁnancial  eco-
nomics most important to the de-
velopment of economies worldwide. These include 
the impact of ﬁnancial development on growth, 
banking and ﬁnancial crises, and corporate ﬁnance 
and governance. His work develops novel empirical 
and theoretical approaches with signiﬁcant policy   
implications. The academic prize is sponsored by 
the  Deutsche  Bank  Donation  Fund  and  carries   
an  endowment  of  EUR  50,000.  It  honors  in-
ternationally  renowned  economic  researchers 
whose work has a marked inﬂuence on research   
concerning questions of ﬁnancial economics and 
macroeconomics,  and  has  led  to  fundamental   
advances  in  economic  theory  and  practice.  The   
CFS awards the prize on a biannual basis in partner-
ship with Goethe University Frankfurt. The prize will   
be  presented  to  Rajan  during  an  academic  CFS 
symposium that will be held at Goethe University 
Frankfurt on 26 September 2013. 
New Research Partners in  
Global Law in Finance  
Network 
The  Doctorate/Ph.D.  Program  in 
Law and Economics of Money and   
Finance  (LEMF)  has  joined  the 
newly  founded  Global  Law  in   
Finance  Network  (GLawFin)  sup-
ported by the 2012 Max Planck Re-
search Prize awarded to Katharina 
Pistor (photo), Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law 
at Columbia Law School, and the Institute for New 
Economic Thinking. The GRNLF is an interdisciplin-
ary network of scholars located at Columbia Univer-
sity, the University of Oxford and Goethe University 
Frankfurt. Brigitte Haar will be collaborating with 
the GRNLF‘s project leader, Katharina Pistor, and Dan 
Awrey from Oxford University. As of the academic 
year 2013/14, the GRNLF will be able to offer one   
doctoral scholarship annually on a per node basis 
as well as research stays at Columbia University 
in New York. The LEMF Program recently had the   
pleasure to host Katharina Pistor who gave a pre-
sentation  on “The  European  Banking  Union  and 
Global Finance” – the kick-off event for the new 
GRNLF. Pistor also held a mini-course on the “Legal 
Construction of Global Finance”, bringing to bear 
her newly-conceived “Legal Theory of Finance”. 13
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The 2009 G20 summit in Pittsburgh ap-
pears to be forgotten. In face of the crisis, 
the  world’s  20  most  important  econo-
mies  then  made  far-reaching  decisions 
on the restructuring of ﬁnancial markets. 
A common basic understanding was that 
a global ﬁnancial market requires a (as far 
as possible) global regulatory framework 
in order to be effective – both in terms of 
itself and the overall economy. However, 
as the interval since the ﬁnancial mar-
ket  crisis  increases,  the  consensus  that  
was achieved then evaporates. This car-
ries the risk of regulatory arbitrage, the  
renationalization of ﬁnancial markets and 
ultimately the weakening of internation-
al trade and investment activities.
There is notable divergence and uncertainty: The 
United States (US) postponed the introduction   
of “Basel III” for indeﬁnite time. Given the expe-
riences from the still not yet introduced “Basel 
II” accord, this provides a poor outlook. Also, the 
separation of investment banking from the rest of 
a universal bank’s activities (i.e. commercial bank-
ing) is understood differently in the US than on 
this side of the Atlantic. In turn, within the Europe-
an Union (EU), many questions were controversial 
for a long time, as shown by the contentious dis-
cussions on the structure of an EU banking super-
vision and settlement, the Capital Requirements 
Directive  IV  (CRD  IV),  the  Solvency  II  Directive 
(Solvency II), the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive II (MiFiD II) and the ﬁnancial transaction 
tax. Debate on a greater separation between trad-
ing and deposit business has only just begun in the 
EU, and the proposed solutions, for example those 
of the Liikanen Group, differ signiﬁcantly from the 
proposals developed by the Vickers Commission in 
the United Kingdom. In addition, the regulation of 
so-called “shadow banking” is still in its infancy.
The delay of these important regulatory plans 
has led to solo initiatives in the EU. On 1 August 
2012, France introduced its own ﬁnancial transac-
tion tax, whilst Germany’s Federal Government 
is pushing ahead with such a levy together with 
other Member States. On 14 February 2013, the 
European  Commission  adopted  a  proposal  for   
a Council Directive implementing enhanced co-
operation in the area of ﬁnancial transaction tax. 
This follows the decision of the Council to autho-
rize enhanced cooperation between 11 Member 
States and the previous consent of the European 
Parliament. It can be critically questioned if the 
adopted provisions and especially the “residence 
principle” and the newly added “issuance princi-
ple” are suitable to prevent ﬁnancial transaction 
tax avoidance.
At  the  same  time,  Germany’s  Federal  Govern-
ment  is  planning  a  law  on  high  frequency   
trading – ahead of the EU decision on (MiFiD II). 
However,  there  are  serious  objections  to  this   
plan – not only because of the isolated nature of 
the action but also due to issues of substance. For 
example, for the ﬁrst time ever, the future clas-
siﬁcation of high frequency trading as ﬁnancial   
or  investment  services  will  make  proprietary   
traders subject to a license requirement under 
the  German  Banking  Act  (Kreditwesengesetz, 
KWG). This, however, is associated with signiﬁ-
cant costs, as the KWG aims to protect customer   
deposits. Proprietary traders would bear these 
costs even though they are not speculating with 
client money. Thus, an authorization requirement 
under the German Stock Exchange Act (Börsenge-
setz) would be more reasonable. Otherwise, there 
is the fear that the trading participants newly   
affected  by  this  requirement  may  withdraw 
from German stock exchanges.
On  6  February  2013,  the  German  government 
proposed  legal  requirements  for  a  separation 
of  proprietary  trading  and  traditional  banking 
business (e.g. lending and deposit business) to 
stabilize the banking sector. Although the basic 
concept is coordinated with France, this is the 
latest  example  for  heterogeneous  activities  in 
the EU.
The examples clearly show that isolated initia-
tives thwart all efforts to unify a single judicial 
area. The EU and its Member States must there-
fore make a fresh attempt to provide uniform 
solutions for pivotal regulatory tasks. 
Florian Rentsch
Hessian Minister for  
Economics, Transport,  
Urban and Regional  
Development
The EU must make a Fresh Attempt for the Uniform Regulation of  
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Events
April
Tuesday, 9th  CFS Presidential Lecture 
5.30 – 7.00 pm  Will the Euro destroy the European Union? 
  Speaker: George Soros, Soros Fund Management LLC
Tuesday, 16th  Finance Seminar 
4.15 – 5.30 pm  Speaker: Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, École polytechnique 
  fédérale de Lausanne
Wednesday, 17th  Applied Microeconomics and Organization Seminar  
5.15 – 6.30 pm  Speaker: Mikhail Drugov, Universidad Carlos III de 
  Madrid
Thursday, 18th  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics 
12.15 – 1.45 pm  Speaker: John Knowles, University of Southampton
Tuesday, 23rd  Finance Seminar 
4.15 – 5.30 pm  Speaker: Alok Kumar, University of Miami
Tuesday, 23rd  CFS Colloquium 
5.30 – 7.00 pm  Die BaFin als Teil der europäischen Aufsichts- 
  strukturen 
  Speaker: Elke König, Federal Financial Supervisory  
  Authority (BaFin)
Wednesday, 24th  Applied Microeconomics and Organization Seminar 
5.15 – 6.30 pm  Speaker: Christian Leuz, Chicago Booth
Thursday, 25th  International Economic Policy Research Seminar 
5.15 – 6.45 pm  Speaker: Gianmarco Leon, University of California,  
  Berkeley
Tuesday, 30th  Finance Seminar 
4.15 – 5.30 pm  Speaker: Lasse Heje Pedersen, Copenhagen Business 
  School
May
Monday, 6th  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics 
12.15 – 1.45 pm  Speaker: Melissa Dell, Harvard University
Monday, 6th  EFL Jour Fixe 
5.00 pm  Green IS and Sustainability of Business Processes 
  Speaker: Stanislav Kreuzer, Goethe University
Tuesday, 7th  Finance Seminar 
4.15 – 5.30 pm  Speaker: Søren Hvidkjær, Copenhagen Business 
  School
Wednesday, 8th  Applied Microeconomics and Organization Seminar 
5.15 – 6.30 pm  Speaker: Sergei Guriev, New Economic School,   
  Moscow
Tuesday, 14th  Finance Seminar 
4.15 – 5.30 pm  Speaker: Engelbert Dockner, Vienna University of  
  Business and Economics
Tuesday, 14th  GBS Broaden your Horizon 
7.00 pm  Die Rolle der Ratingagenturen in der Wirtschaft  
  und in der Krise 
  Speaker: Daniel Kolter, Moody‘s Germany,  
  Benjamin Sahel, ECB
Thursday, 16th  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics 
12.15 – 1.45 pm  Enrichetta Ravina, Columbia Business School
Tuesday, 21st  Finance Seminar 
4.15 – 5.30 pm  Speaker: Evgeny Lyandres, Boston University
Tuesday, 21st  IMFS Distinguished Lecture  
  Speaker: James Bullard, Federal Reserve Bank of  
  St. Louis
Wednesday, 22nd  ILF Guest Lecture 
7.00 – 9.00 pm  Common Banking Supervision in the Eurozone 
  Speaker: Guido Ferrarini, University of Genoa
Wednesday, 22nd  Applied Microeconomics and Organization Seminar  
5.15 –6.30 pm   Speaker: Pauline Grosjean, University of 
  New South Wales
Tuesday, 28th  Finance Seminar 
4.15 – 5.30 pm  Speaker: Geoffrey Tate, UNC Kenan-Flagler Business  
  School
Wednesday, 29th  Applied Microeconomics and Organization Seminar 
5.15 – 6.30 pm  Entrepreneurial Innovation, Patent Protection and 
  Industry Dynamics 
  Speaker: Javier Suarez, Centro de Estudios  
  Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI), Madrid
June
Monday, 3rd  International Economic Policy Research Seminar 
2.15 – 3.45 pm  Speaker: Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University
Monday, 3rd  Joint Micro- and Macroeconomics Seminar 
5.00 pm  Speaker: Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University
Monday, 3rd  EFL Jour Fixe 
5.00 pm  The Development of German Installment Loans:  
  An Age Group Analysis 
  Speaker: Philipp Blommel, E-Finance Lab
Tuesday, 4th  Finance Seminar 
4.15 – 5.30 pm  Speaker: Loriano Mancini, École Polytechnique  
  Fédérale de Lausanne
Thursday, 6th  International Economic Policy Research Seminar 
5.15 – 6.45 pm  Speaker: Marianne Saam, ZEW Mannheim
Tuesday, 11th  CFS Colloquium 
5.30 – 7.00 pm  Banking in Times of Low Interest Rates:  
  New Strategies for Universal Banks 
  Speaker: Anshu Jain, Deutsche Bank AG
Wednesday, 12th  Applied Microeconomics and Organization Seminar 
5.15 – 6.30 pm  Speaker: Alexander Sebald, University of  
  Copenhagen
Thursday, 13th  International Economic Policy Research Seminar 
5.15 – 6.45 pm  Speaker: Jean-Marie Baland, University of Namur
Tuesday, 18th –  CFS and NETSPAR Research Conference 
Wednesday, 19th  International Pension Workshop 
9.00 am – 5.00 pm
Thursday, 20th  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics   
12.15 – 1.45 pm  Speaker: Greg Veramendi, Arizona State University
Wednesday, 26th  Applied Microeconomics and Organization Seminar 
5.15 – 6.30 pm  Speaker: Yves Zenou, Stockholm University
Thursday, 27th  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics 
12.15 – 1.45 pm  Speaker: Hans Gersbach, ETH Zurich
Please note that for some events registration is compulsory.Center of Excellence SAFE | Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
A Cooperation of the Center for Financial Studies and Goethe University Frankfurt